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Key Points
· “Strategic philanthropy” has become a dominant 
theme among foundations in the past few de-
cades.
· While many foundations have developed strategic 
plans, few have made the internal changes neces-
sary to actually behave strategically.
· Four challenges to strategic philanthropy are iden-
tified, including strategies developed in isolation 
from grantees that execute them and misaligned 
foundation structures, processes, and cultures 
that do not support strategic endeavors. 
· In order to get beyond the veneer of strategic 
philanthropy, foundation leaders need to be clearer 
about their own role in creating change, develop 
the strategic capacities to do so, and then apply 
those capacities, learn from them, and improve 
them over time.
Introduction
Over the past few decades, foundations have 
taken up “strategic philanthropy” with a ven-
geance. By doing so, they seek not only to provide 
grant support to nonprofits, but to assess social 
problems, develop strategies to solve them, and 
track the results of their efforts.
Recently, debates within the field have raised 
substantial questions regarding the value of 
strategic philanthropy.1 Some have raised the 
1 For example, Paul Brest and William Schambra debate at a 
2008 Philanthropy Roundtable meeting and Brest and Sean 
Stannard-Stockton's session on “Strategic Philanthropy and 
Effective Grantmaker-Grantee Relationships” at the Grant-
makers for Effective Organizations’ 2010 conference. 
concern that in extreme strategic philanthropy 
can be overly controlling and “reduce nonprofits 
to contractors” (Dorfman, 2008). They also assert 
that foundations tend to remain too distant to be 
sufficiently knowledgeable about what happens 
“on the ground.” Proponents believe that strategic 
philanthropy lends more focus and alignment to 
endeavors and therefore offers a greater likeli-
hood of impact.
These observers have argued persuasively about 
both the potential strengths and weaknesses of 
strategic philanthropy. We posit an alternative 
discourse – that strategic philanthropy has been 
only partially conceived, let alone implemented, 
in most foundations. At this time, a definitive as-
sessment on the merits of strategic philanthropy 
would be based on what we believe is only partial, 
and for that matter, fairly weak, implementation.  
The Veneer of Strategic Philanthropy
Most foundations have adopted only the veneer 
of strategic philanthropy. A look at foundation 
board books will reveal its trademarks – theories 
of change or logic models, strategy papers, per-
formance metrics, trustee-friendly dashboards. 
Yet, these elements alone do not make founda-
tions strategic, nor are they enough for strategic 
philanthropy.
In a qualitative study we conducted for the Evalu-
ation Roundtable (Patrizi & Thompson, 2008), 
we asked senior foundation staff how they think 
about, learn about, and develop a strategy. Many 
of those interviewed acknowledged that their 
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foundations were struggling to realize the prom-
ise of strategic philanthropy, and they expressed 
frustration with current approaches.  As one said, 
it has become “more of an academic exercise than 
anything else.” Another noted: “We just got done 
with a two-year strategic planning cycle, but now 
we don’t know where to start.” Others thought 
that strategy belonged more to the consultants 
producing them than to the foundations them-
selves. Strategies were faulted as tactical execu-
tion plans that specify the future behaviors of 
outside players and assume the world will align 
itself accordingly. 
It’s not that practitioners dismissed outright their 
attempts to be more strategic. Most strategies 
were considered potentially useful. But all were 
said to suffer from a common malady: failure to 
adapt to issues on the ground. 
Without question, foundations produce “strate-
gies.” But the efforts do not extend to changes 
within the foundations themselves, thereby 
leaving few as capable strategic organizations.  If 
we consider the baseline position from where 
most foundations started – what the Center for 
Effective Philanthropy calls a “charitable banker” 
(Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2007) – few 
have considered the implications of what it takes 
to evolve into a fully strategic foundation. 
We see many foundations acting as if they can 
adopt this fundamentally new role without chang-
ing the operations, culture, competencies, and 
structure of the foundation itself. They fall into a 
natural trap, adopting the veneer of strategic phi-
lanthropy without making the deeper institutional 
changes needed to support it. 
In brief, many foundations fall short of being 
effective because they seek to change what they 
do without considering how they do it. Form 
doesn’t follow function, and we believe it has 
consequences for how effective a foundation can 
become in its strategic endeavors. 
Four Challenges Foundations Face in 
Adopting Strategic Philanthropy
To help foundations improve their approaches 
to strategy, we convened the Strategy Forum in 
May 2008, working on behalf of the Evaluation 
Roundtable.2 Senior staff from 28 foundations 
gathered at the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
in Princeton, N.J., for a three-day effort to tackle 
these tough issues (Appendix). 
Based on what we learned at the Strategy 
Forum, as well as our own experience conduct-
ing program strategy evaluations and creating 
assessment systems for foundations, we believe 
that foundation leaders must address four key 
challenges to their efforts to be more strategic and 
more effective.  
Challenge 1: Strategy Planning Is Separated 
From Doing 
We’ve found that many foundations make the 
mistake of approaching strategy development 
as an upfront, analytic exercise that ends when 
implementation begins.
After an initial burst of strategic planning, grants 
are made; staff then move on to making new 
grants or developing other strategies. “Strategy” 
as such is for the most part viewed as a document 
prepared early on, not a process that needs to be 
refined based on experience. “For us, strategy is a 
piece of paper,” is how one foundation staff person 
put it – underscoring how inert the treatment of 
strategy can be.
Yet many in philanthropy know well the com-
plexity involved in their work. They know there 
2 The Evaluation Roundtable is a community of practice 
that has been meeting consistently since 1988. Originally 
developed as a way for evaluation directors to learn from 
each other, membership has expanded to include senior 
management and program and communication staff.  Patri-
cia Patrizi directs the Roundtable.
Many foundations fall short of being 
effective because they seek to change 
what they do without considering 
how they do it.
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are few certainties regarding many foundation-
supported interventions. They know that what is 
first conceived in a document will need to evolve 
quickly when it hits the wall of reality. They in-
creasingly understand how context-bound success 
really is. They also know that any intervention 
supported by a foundation inevitably occurs in 
the context of many other such interventions, and 
that effects imagined during planning are likely to 
be very different in practice. In reality, implemen-
tation never goes as planned. If anything can and 
should be anticipated in planning, it is that most 
of what has been planned will necessarily change.  
Despite recognizing these realities, many foun-
dations still approach planning as though the 
work they do is predictable, conflict does not 
exist, leveraged resources will just happen, and 
interventions can be “taken to scale” without 
adaptation to groups or circumstances. In other 
words, foundations plan as though plans actually 
materialize as they were written.
The emphasis on upfront planning is understand-
able for two reasons. First, some of the “determin-
ism” in foundation planning may be a reaction to 
a past in which some foundations made grants 
with little regard to the likely effectiveness of ei-
ther their strategies or the work of their grantees. 
In this light, hyperrational planning behavior 
can be viewed as a reasonable reaction to past 
practices that could be called highly irrational. 
The relative ease with which foundations can 
squander resources is a serious problem, and 
many foundations have emphasized planning and 
metrics to prevent it. Second, many foundations 
rely on the planning discipline to stay on top of 
what constitutes effective practice. Yet in these 
pursuits, foundations often learn less about the 
issues that matter – what happens once grants are 
made. 
What is missed in the prevailing practice of 
planning is the critical role a foundation can and 
should play in developing strategy as it is ex-
ecuted. For example, performance metrics have 
an important place – when you know enough to 
identify what to measure and how to measure 
it. Performance metrics require a solid under-
standing of exactly how implementation should 
occur and what measures will indicate success. In 
business, most performance metrics emerge from 
statistical analysis of process variance. But this 
is almost never the case for foundation strate-
gies, especially not at their outset. The result can 
be metrics imposed based upon nothing more 
than mere speculation, with no grounding in real 
experience. 
Implementation is too complex to assume that 
strategy can be developed at just one point in 
time and remain fixed. The world does not stay 
constant. At the Strategy Forum, Michael Quinn 
Patton explained the fallacy of this assump-
tion by citing Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth 
Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke’s perspective on 
military strategy: “No battle plan ever survives 
contact with the enemy.” Research into the failure 
of implementation is legion (e.g., Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1980). Whether in military, corpo-
rate, or foundation settings, strategy develop-
ment requires ways to learn from action on the 
ground. As Henry Mintzberg, one of the foremost 
corporate strategists, advised Strategy Forum 
participants: “You don’t plan a strategy; you learn 
a strategy.” This is not a license for foundations 
to make funding decisions without a sufficient 
examination of what has been tried in the past 
and learning from those experiences. Rather, that 
alone is insufficient.
What is often missing is real learning about strat-
egy execution. A recent survey we conducted for 
the Evaluation Roundtable identified post-grant 
collection and use of award information as the 
single weakest area of foundation learning. 
What is missed in the prevailing 
practice of planning is the critical 
role a foundation can and should 
play in developing strategy as it is 
executed.
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The less trust we have in our 
partners, the more likely we are to 
micro-monitor them and require 
more data and reporting.
Strategists must stay alert to execution as strategy 
encounters the outside world. Too often founda-
tions rely on performance metrics, dashboards, or 
other tools that are woefully inadequate for learn-
ing about strategy and what happens as a strategy 
moves beyond concept and into implementation. 
Although these tools can be useful in tracking 
progress toward achieving a goal, they offer little 
insight or guidance on why things go wrong, as 
they inevitably do. These methods provide little, 
if any, information about what is working or not. 
Foundations need to become better at learning 
how their strategies are being executed. They 
need the information that can inform them about 
how to adapt their strategies to better meet the 
changing reality on the ground. They then need 
the ways, time, and incentives to put this informa-
tion to good use.  
Learning is important not because it allows 
foundation staff to accumulate knowledge. It’s 
important because strategy success depends on it. 
Challenge 2: Whose Strategy Is It, Anyway? 
Not only are plans often separated from imple-
mentation, they’re often developed in isolation 
from those doing the work – the grantees sup-
ported to execute the strategy. It is difficult to 
think of a setting where it would be good practice 
for an organization to develop a plan that others 
would carry out. Yet this is precisely what we do 
to our grantees. 
Even when grantees are included in planning, 
they’re rarely seen as full partners in the pro-
cess, with considerable sweat equity, reputation, 
careers, and institutional capital on the table. 
Consider the five stages for building shared vision 
described by Bryan Smith of Innovation Associ-
ates: telling, selling, testing, consulting, and co-
creating (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, & Smith, 
1994, p. 314). 
At best, the engagement between funders and 
grantees around strategy tends to be one of 
consulting. At worst, it is closer to mere telling. 
Foundations typically bring grantees to the table 
either so early in the process that the discussion 
is necessarily general, or so late in the process 
that the strategy is fully formed and only grantee 
agreement is sought. The most fertile opportuni-
ties for interaction between grantees and founda-
tions – often around the thorny and pivotal issues 
related to the realties of implementation – are 
lost. 
Further complicating foundation learning is the 
power imbalance between foundations and their 
grantees, which inevitably distorts information 
flow and impedes feedback, particularly around 
what is not working. Overcoming this dynamic 
requires the time and trust to build a mutual 
understanding of and commitment to each other’s 
agenda. There is a wealth of contract research 
showing that the less trust we have in our part-
ners, the more likely we are to micro-monitor 
them and require more data and reporting. Such 
irrelevant monitoring activities rarely succeed 
in building knowledge (just consider how many 
grantee reports go unread!). Worse yet, they can 
lead to more mistrust and stalemated decisions 
about how to take important corrective action 
when needed. 
A frequent result is weak strategy. Another is 
inadequate grantee understanding of foundation 
work. In our interviews, foundation leaders read-
ily acknowledged that “grantees don’t understand 
our strategy.” Although many downplay this issue 
as merely a “communication problem,” we think it 
goes to the more central issue of whether founda-
tions know how to create real working partner-
ships with grantees in the strategic enterprise. 
Grantees need to be treated as the central 
partners that they ultimately are in the strategy 
process. They are not only the main executors of 
strategy, but have the on-the-ground knowledge 
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and experience essential to sort the wheat from 
chaff in strategic thinking. We doubt if many 
foundations would dismiss key grantee partners 
as essential for successful strategy execution. Yet 
the lack of real partnership hampers the work of 
many, if not most, foundations. One reason for 
the strategic estrangement between funder and 
funded is that some foundations believe fuller 
engagement will obligate them to work in this 
way with all their grantees, or will lead to so many 
cooks that the result is a strategic muddle worse 
than what they already encounter. So too, behind 
much of this is the desire to avoid conflict. Our 
experience tells us, however, that the conflict is 
not avoided; it is simply postponed to the time 
when serious implementation issues arise.
While we don’t advise or expect foundations to 
include every grantee in every aspect of their 
strategy work, we do believe foundations need 
a core set of partners in strategy development, 
negotiation, and debate – partners who have the 
experience and knowledge necessary for success-
ful implementation and who can productively 
challenge foundation assumptions. This will take 
time that some, and likely many, foundations 
believe they don’t have. But we know, from our 
interviews and work with foundations evaluating 
strategies, that the lack of genuine engagement 
between key grantees and funders on strategic 
issues in the end hurts funders nearly as much as 
grantees and makes strategic success less likely. 
Foundations cannot afford to treat these real and 
inevitably crucial strategic partners as passive 
entities in the strategy-development process. 
Challenge 3: Does Your Organization Support 
Your Strategy? 
This fundamental shift for a foundation – from 
banker to strategist – rarely has triggered an 
examination of how it needs to change its orga-
nization – the people, structure, resources, and 
processes to support its strategy work. 
We’ve often observed foundations aiming to be 
agile, flexible, and capable of quickly responding 
to strategic challenges . . . then doing none of the 
above once the strategy rolls out. Why does this 
happen? Clues emerged at the Strategy Forum, 
where the conversation made clear that founda-
tions’ ambitious goals are often at odds with the 
ways they structure and manage themselves. 
We found that the structure-strategy conflict 
often arises because foundations find themselves 
divided between two organizational types: the 
bureaucracy on the one hand, and what Mintz-
berg (2007) calls the “adhocracy” on the other. 
These are two fundamentally different models, 
each with a distinct – and often diametrically 
opposed – set of values, decision-making rules, 
and management styles. According to Mintzberg, 
adhocracies are highly organic organizational 
forms with little formalization of behavior, roles, 
and expectations, whereas bureaucracies embrace 
traditional hierarchical modes of authority with 
highly formalized behavior, roles, and expecta-
tions. 
The tension between the two models is perhaps 
clearest when we consider how foundations ap-
proach their two main functions: grants adminis-
tration (suited to bureaucracy) and program strat-
egy (suited to adhocracy). In this bimodal system, 
grants-management staff require a great deal of 
regimentation, whereas program staff require the 
freedom to innovate and pursue entrepreneurial 
instincts. Grants management requires strong, re-
liable systems that operate in fixed ways at regular 
intervals in a highly static context. Program 
strategy is the opposite: It requires innovation, 
adaptation, and learning in a constantly evolving 
context. 
How, then, does foundation management 
typically respond to an organization containing 
conflicting pressures to exert bureaucratic control 
and provide enormous freedom? They respond 
as managers have responded for centuries – by 
focusing management resources and systems on 
Grantees need to be treated as the 
central partners that they ultimately 
are in the strategy process.
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creating high levels of control over that which 
is, or appears to be, controllable (Perrow, 1986). 
In short, bureaucracy dominates. Repeatedly, 
we have seen the grants process and accounting 
procedures monopolize management attention 
and institutional schedule. In turn, boards often 
grow to expect the same certainty from program 
staff that financial and grants management staff 
can offer. 
And foundation information systems tend to be 
far better structured for processing grant applica-
tions, payment, and reporting than for informing 
foundations about strategy. In fact, few founda-
tions have developed even the most rudimentary 
methods for tracking grants in terms of strategy.
In our evaluation work, many foundations are 
often unable to provide even basic data connect-
ing individual grants to a strategy. One executive 
we interviewed discovered this problem when he 
asked program officers how much was invested 
in each strategy. They didn’t know. In response, 
the foundation began coding grants by strategy 
and found that 55 percent of grants fell outside of 
their articulated strategies. 
The consequences for information management 
are the tip of the iceberg if we consider how the 
demands of foundation bureaucracy can under-
mine learning. Without a commitment to learn-
ing, the structure to support it, and the discipline 
to act in response to what is learned, staff energy 
and time is pulled in by a bureaucracy’s gravita-
tional force. 
Many foundations have not sufficiently shaped 
the role of program staff to maximize learning 
about strategy execution. For foundations to be 
full strategists, this type of learning needs to be 
more central to the work of program staff than it 
appears to be at most foundations. In our inter-
views, foundation leaders readily acknowledged 
that program staff members often “do not have 
the time to learn.” Because foundations organize 
themselves around making grants, program staff 
can face enormous pressure to attend to the next 
grant in the queue rather than review current ef-
forts that are in the implementation phase – just 
when learning is most essential to adapt strate-
gies to changing circumstances. It’s an imbalance 
at the heart of what limits successful learning in 
foundations. 
Challenge 4: Most Strategies Are Silent on the 
Foundation’s Role 
Foundation staff can speak easily about the ways 
that they add value beyond dollars, including 
their ability to convene, see the “big picture,” share 
learning, and spread knowledge among grantees. 
Yet most foundations are relatively silent on the 
role to play in strategy as it is implemented. 
Beyond funding grantees, most strategies focus 
on what others will do. Little is specified about 
the role or value the foundation will bring once 
the strategy is in play. In fact, the strategy role is 
often discussed as what the foundation will fund. 
We wonder, then, if this is distinguished from the 
practices of charitable bankers only by linkages 
made to a theory of change as a rationale for the 
grantmaking. This is, of course, important – but a 
far cry from the more robust role that the “greats” 
adopt in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. 
For foundations to go beyond the rhetoric of 
being more than “bankers,” they need to be far 
clearer about what they do and the capacities they 
need that can add value to advance strategy. They 
must, in other words, develop and make explicit 
their role, skills, and expertise – their strategic 
competence – in supporting social change, and 
apply it, learn from it, and improve it. Most 
Because foundations organize 
themselves around making grants, 
program staff can face enormous 
pressure to attend to the next grant 
in the queue rather than review 
current efforts that are in the 
implementation phase.
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foundations have given little specific attention to 
building their organizations such that they can 
effectively advance their aims. 
Nonetheless, most foundation executives have 
views about the roles they should assume; the 
problem we see is that few have built and aligned 
their organizations to match their visions. For 
example, a foundation that seeks to be an “honest 
broker” in contentious debates and works to bring 
vested parties together to solve problems needs 
different capacities than those required by a foun-
dation that aims to improve nonprofit organiza-
tional effectiveness.  
A foundation that seeks to fill an honest broker 
role needs staff talented at negotiation and pos-
sessing political skills, and with a reputation that 
holds clout with the vested parties. It needs the 
capacities or resources that help to establish itself 
as relatively neutral or at least prompted more 
by evidence than ideology. Such a strategy might 
include capacity to produce research, report 
cards, and efforts to make systems more transpar-
ent, etc. Two foundations that we know well are 
so committed to this role that they have brought 
some of these functions in-house, thereby al-
lowing them to control the quality and tone of 
product reports. 
A foundation that supports organizational ef-
fectiveness, on the other hand, requires deep 
understanding of the nonprofit sector and the 
organizations within it, including how to assess 
and promote leadership, governance, finance, 
and human resources, among other things that 
shape nonprofit performance. It also requires a 
deep understanding of the sector’s relationship 
with government. It knows how to purchase the 
consultants and technical assistance that they 
apply, and may adopt a capital financing strategy 
or invest in the means to deliver performance 
information within the sector. Most importantly, 
it has the capacity to select nonprofits that are ex-
cellent or have the potential to become excellent 
at delivering their core services.
In light of these very different strategies and func-
tions, these two foundations should be very dif-
ferent organizations – not just in their capacities, 
but in terms of their time horizons, the nature of 
their relationships, and the types and amounts of 
resources they use. We imagine that these foun-
dations differ, too, in how they structure grants 
and whether and if they use loans to foster their 
goals.  
But what we have found is that while foundations 
may give considerable thought to the kinds of 
substantive knowledge they want to acquire or 
build in specific fields, such as health care or edu-
cation, they have been fairly agnostic in consider-
ing the skills needed to be active participants in 
the types of strategy they put forward. 
Foundations effective in strategic philanthropy 
are those that not only articulate these roles about 
how they add value, but also develop the core 
competencies to successfully do so. With more 
clarity about strategic role, a foundation has the 
possibility, with experience, focused examina-
tion, and learning, to be able to hone its strategic 
skill sets toward excellence, resulting in tangible 
“value.” 
Ten Years Later, Do Foundations Add More 
Value?
Eleven years ago, Porter and Kramer (1999) chal-
lenged foundations to wrestle with the question of 
how they create sufficient value to justify their tax 
exemption. Someday, perhaps soon, someone will 
ask again the question they raised – in essence: 
While foundations may give 
considerable thought to the kinds 
of substantive knowledge they want 
to acquire or build in specific fields, 
such as health care or education, 
they have been fairly agnostic in 
considering the skills needed to be 
active participants in the types of 
strategy they put forward. 
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Has philanthropy created the value to justify its 
initial tax deduction and the tax relief it accrues 
over time? In other words, are we achieving the 
social benefit that is philanthropy’s promise?
History might judge philanthropy’s effort to 
become more strategic in the decade since as 
incomplete at best. To be sure, many more foun-
dations have become more focused, embraced 
new roles, applied more logic and clarity to their 
work, and, generally, thought more about what it 
means to be strategic. But how much value has 
this added?
Porter and Kramer highlighted “value creating” 
practices like selecting the best grantees, signal-
ing other funders about grantee effectiveness, 
improving grantee performance, and advancing 
the state of knowledge and practice. These sound 
practices should apply to all foundations, from 
“charitable bankers” to “total strategists.” 
But to maximize their effectiveness, founda-
tions must go beyond these core practices. They 
must, as Good to Great author Jim Collins urged 
participants at the Center for Effective Philan-
thropy’s March 2009 conference, “attain piercing 
clarity about how to produce the best long term 
results” and identify what “you can be best in the 
world at.” 
Foundations have a ways to go in achieving this 
clarity, if you consider one striking piece of re-
search. In the Urban Institute’s 2004 study Foun-
dation Effectiveness: Definitions and Challenges, 
Francie Ostrower found: 
Foundations typically defined what effectiveness 
means in their foundations in highly general terms. 
The wide-ranging answers given and comparatively 
low percentages citing any one component testify to 
the variability of definitions of effectiveness in the 
field. The generality of the responses is indicative 
of the fact that so many foundations have not really 
thought through the specific meaning of effectiveness 
within the context of their own institution (emphasis 
added). (Ostrower, 2004, p 3.)
This study named what many already knew – that 
the field had far to go toward articulating and re-
alizing a vision of what effectiveness might mean, 
and how to get there, for the individual founda-
tion. Defining effectiveness within a foundation 
will necessarily depend on the type of foundation 
and its role in the strategic enterprise. Yet it is 
possible and necessary, and the job of foundation 
leaders. Foundations require this clarity from the 
groups they fund; they should hold themselves to 
no lower standard. 
Ultimately, this responsibility comes down to 
foundation leaders. They cannot merely adopt 
theories of change, metrics, etc., and expect that 
effectiveness will follow. They need to wrestle 
with what their real value is and develop the 
adaptive capacities to hone their competence at 
delivering that value. They need to make changes 
to their organizational structure to enable them 
to work on the front lines of strategy. They need 
to engage with grantees as full partners in devel-
oping and implementing strategy. They need to 
get closer to implementation and work through 
the implications of what they learn to improve 
strategies as they evolve. Most of all, they need to 
get better at learning and applying that learning 
to strategy. 
Foundation leaders deserve credit for seeking 
more restraint and focus, be it through strategic 
philanthropy or other means. We hope these 
same leaders will confront the challenges raised 
in this paper, including the lofty and unlikely ex-
pectations that are set, as well as the communica-
tions, structures, and other ways of working that 
hamper their ability to be effective. This takes 
discipline and time. It’s not an accident that Jim 
Collins uses the word “discipline” repeatedly in 
the course of his essay, Good to Great and the So-
cial Sectors (2005). It is the key to building great 
teams, ideas and, ultimately, great foundations. 
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APPENDIX
The following foundations participated in the 
May 2008 Strategy Forum: Annie E. Casey Foun-
dation, Atlantic Philanthropies, Barr Founda-
tion, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Bruner 
Foundation, California Endowment, California 
HealthCare Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of 
New York, Cleveland Foundation, David and Lu-
cile Packard Foundation, Duke Endowment, Edna 
McConnell Clark Foundation, Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation, Foundation Lucie et 
Andre Chagnon, Hartford Foundation, Heinz En-
dowments, J.W. McConnell Family Foundation, 
John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, Lumina 
Foundation for Education, The New York State 
Health Foundation, Ontario Trillium Founda-
tion, The Pew Charitable Trusts, The Pittsburgh 
Foundation, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 
Rockefeller Foundation, W.K. Kellogg Founda-
tion, Wallace Foundation, and the William Penn 
Foundation.
